Work-family balance and childbearing intentions in France, Germany and Russia

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Preliminary version

1. Introduction

In the 1970s and 1980s, one of the main explanations for the fall in fertility was the rise in women's paid employment (Rindfuss *et al.,* 1996). Among OECD member-countries, those with the highest fertility were those where the rate of female employment was lowest. Difficulties in balancing work and family responsibilities and cultural reluctance to mothers being active in the labour market often led women to opt between working and having children (or a large number). And yet, in the mid-1980s, the correlation between fertility and women's economic activity, which had been negative, became positive at the macro-economic level (Ahn and Mira, 2002; Engelhardt and Prskawetz, 2002)[1]. It is now rather those countries where women's presence in the labour market is high that post the highest fertility rates (and vice versa). High female employment can be combined with relatively high fertility when policies facilitate the combination of paid work and parenthood (Bernhard, 1993; Brewster and Rindfuss, 2000).

This has led to a new way of addressing the relationship between fertility and economic activity, in both university and political circles. In a context of fertility decline and delay of parenthood nearly everywhere in Europe (Koehler *et al.,* 2002; Sobotka, 2004), academic and policy debate is concerned with the definition of policy measures to stop the decrease in fertility. The dominant idea now is that policies that that reduce the incompatibility of work and family life can affect fertility (Esping-Andersen *et al.*, 2002). The *OECD Employment Outlook 2001* states, "Work-family balance is also important for longer trends in population… It is plausible that improvement in the work-family balance could help to increase both the

[1] In the 15-member European Union, this positive correlation between fertility and female employment is significant (0,53); it is rather lower in the 25-member Union (0,43). The reason is that the correlation is slight but negative in the ten countries that joined in 2004 (–0,27), which all have low fertility rates.

current employment rates and fertility rates" (OECD, 2001). Policies to reconcile work and family life are also a major theme on the European agenda.

This shift in the relationship between paid work and fertility has come about against a background of major changes in the labour market. Since the mid-1980s, increasing economic instability and exposure to international competition have caused a rise in labour productivity and flexibility (Ashkenazy *et al.,* 2002). Many of these organisational changes make work more attractive, but at the cost of greater work intensity, diversified working hours and the development of professional versatility and atypical types of employment (Bué *et al.,* 1999). At the same time, uncertainty in the labour market has grown and unemployment has persisted. We know that the timing of births can be influenced by employment stability (Meron and Widmer, 2002). This development of more flexibility in employment status (fewer long-term full-time jobs) and working hours (non-standard hours, more intense work) particularly affects women, who are mainly employed in the service sector.

This article looks at the relationship between fertility and, first, action to reconcile work and family life, and, second, the individual's status in the labour market. More specifically, it examines fertility intentions. On the hypothesis that fertility is planned and effectively controlled, these intentions may be seen as an indicator or predictor of behaviour, and therefore future fertility (Schoen *et al.,* 1999). Factors influencing intentions may in turn influence fertility behaviour. We assess how occupational status and work-family policy may affect fertility intentions. It is assumed that fertility decisions are made in consideration of people's current employment status and expected change after a birth, including work-family policy. Where these policies are advanced, women more often anticipate returning to work after a birth. The purpose of the research is to reveal whether the reproductive intentions and employment decisions are correlated, and identify determinants of fertility decisions.

We examine fertility intentions for a specific period, namely the next three years. The aim is to study the desire for children against individuals' current constraints and opportunities. The choice of a fairly short period makes it more likely that responses will be realistic and can be used to measure probable behaviour. In addition, fertility intentions for a specific period are relatively good predictors of fertility (Williams *et al.,* 1999).

We present a comparative analysis of three countries with quite different economic and institutional features: France, Germany and Russia. The analysis uses data from the first panel wave of the Generation and Gender Survey, which are particularly useful for examining the effect of work-life reconciliation policy and employment insecurity on fertility intentions.

First, we briefly recapitulate the theories that connect fertility with employment. Second, we present the economic and institutional context of the three countries. And finally the method and results are given.

2. Theoretical background

2.1. Dominant theoretical framework

The dominant economic theory for fertility decisions belongs to neo-classical economics, or "new home economics" (Becker, 1981). Each individual or household is assumed to possess resources of time and money and to exchange them for goods and services (which they may enjoy now or later) in order to maximise their own well-being. Within this framework, the decision to have a child is a rational one, and parents balance the costs and benefits of children. The benefits include the child him- or herself and the guarantee they may represent for the parents' old age. There are two types of cost: the direct costs of having children (caring for them, education costs, etc.) and the opportunity cost or income lost by withdrawing from the labour market to care for the child. This opportunity cost may be short-term, i.e. the income lost when leaving a job, and long-term, i.e. the missed career opportunities due to these interruptions (Bielby, 1992). According to this theory, any reduction in the cost of children or any increase in income is expected to increase the demand for children (Becker 1981; Cigno 1991).

2.2. Company work-life policies

Family policy may affect the cost of children or the household's income and in this way influence the "demand" for children. For example, family allowances, tax reductions for children, payments for maternity or paternity leave compensate for the drop in income due to education expenses or mothers' absence from the workplace. By reducing the cost of the child, these policies may have a positive effect on fertility.

Work-family life reconciliation policies may also affect costs. By reducing the "structural incompatibility" between work and family life (Liefbroer and Corijn, 1999), they may cut the duration of absences from work and therefore the losses of income due to these absences. The availability of subsidised childcare arrangements, for example, enables mothers to go on working. In order to be attractive, childcare services must be affordable, high quality and flexible in opening hours.

Two players may operate such work-life policies: the State, naturally, but another player is increasingly involved, namely employers (OECD, 2002-2005; EGGSIE, 2005; den Dulk, 2001). In recent years employers have been encouraged to implement their own family-

friendly policies in various countries. In France, for example, a "family tax credit" was introduced in 2004 with the aim of encouraging companies to provide childcare. Companies can act in two main areas: provision of childcare facilities and the guarantee of flexible working time arrangements. However, childcare is hard to set up. For the employer this is a complex matter, motivated by strong demand from employees and usefulness for the company (Daune-Richard *et al.,* 2007). As we shall see, provision of childcare by employers remains rare.

Another lever for employers is working hours and holidays. By ensuring shorter hours for their employees, variable workweek arrangements, days off for unexpected events such as a child's illness, etc., they create a working environment that makes it possible to combine employment and family responsibilities. Note that this flexibility of working hours to help the work-family balance is a separate issue from the flexibility of employment status, labour costs or total working time, which employers often seek. It is by adapting working hours to employees' constraints that a family-friendly environment is created.

2.3. Stability of employment

Another major explanation for the decline of fertility related to employment is the development of economic insecurity (Blossfeld *et al.,* 2005; Mills and Blossfeld, 2005). High economic uncertainty occurs in early adulthood, with high rates of youth unemployment and job instability. This economic insecurity is particularly noticeable in transition economies.

Employment instability is an important determinant of fertility choices. However, economic insecurity may have two opposite effects on fertility. Having a stable job may be a prerequisite for family formation. The development of short-term employment and unemployment may provide an incentive to delay decisions that involve long-term commitments, such as childbearing. High unemployment among the young also reduces the opportunity cost of staying in education. When individuals arrive on the labour market with higher qualifications, the opportunity cost of having a child is also higher, which reduces fertility (Kohler *et al.,* 2006). Economic conditions are thought to influence the opportunities for and constraints on having children that individuals and couples perceive, and also the expected costs and benefits of having children. In particular, the more uncertain one's socioeconomic conditions, the higher one may perceive the cost of having children.

On the other hand, unemployment lowers the opportunity cost of children, and individuals facing difficulties on the labour market may decide to centre their lives on the private sphere (especially women) and invest in children. Parenthood may produce biographical certainty (Friedman *et al.,* 1994) and may be desired, particularly if fertility is valued in society and by

peers and relatives. In this case, unemployment would increase fertility, or at least accelerate it.

2.4. Previous empirical studies

The literature assessing the effects of reconciliation policies on fertility presents highly variable findings according to the institutional arrangements (see Gauthier, 2007, for a survey of the literature). So the provision of childcare does have a positive effect on fertility, but only a slight one (Pasqua *et al.,* 2005; Del Boca, 2002; Kravdal, 1996). It is not significant in Finland, Germany and Sweden (Hank and Kreyenfeld, 2003; Rønsen, 2004; Anderson *et al.,* 2004). Similarly, findings differ as to the effect of parental leave on fertility. Some studies report a slight positive impact of parental leave, mainly because of a tempo effect (Rønsen, 1999, 2004; Hoem, 1993; Lalive and Zweimüller, 2005; Büttner and Lutz, 1990). Others report that completed family size is not affected (Hoem *et al.,* 2001). Similarly, the availability of part-time work operates positively in the Netherlands, Belgian Flanders and Italy (Liefbroer *et al.,* 1999; Del Boca, 2002) whereas the effect is negative in the United States (Budig, 2003). On the other hand, existing research is in agreement on the fact that flexible working hours encourage fertility, whatever the institutional arrangements (Del Boca, 2002; Bettio and Villa, 1998; Castles, 2003; Bernardi *et al.,* 2007). In all, family-friendly policies have something of a positive effect on fertility. Castles (2003), for example, reveals a positive relationship between a composite indicator of family-friendly policies and the fertility rate in 21 OECD countries.

Here too, the institutional arrangements are a determining factor in the effect of unemployment or female non-employment on fertility. Unemployment delays the formation of a family in France (Meron and Widmer, 2002), in Belgian Flanders (Impens, 1989) and in Germany among the most highly qualified (Kreyenfeld*,* 2005). It has a positive one in Norway (Kravdal, 1994). Studies of the effect on fertility of occupational instability and atypical employment mainly cover Southern European countries, where these types of employment are particularly developed. They confirm the hypothesis that fertility is postponed where employment is unstable (Ahn and Mira, 2001; de la Rica and Iza, 2005).

We examine how employment status and reconciliation policies may affect fertility intentions in three countries with differing welfare states.

3. A comparative study

Russia, Germany and France were the largest countries by population in Europe in 2007[2], with 141.7, 82.3 and 61.7 million respectively (Population Reference Bureau, 2007). The three countries differ in their demographic and economic situations, the extent of female participation in the labour market, their gender values and their policies for family support and help in reconciling work and family life.

Germany and Russia share a very low fertility rate. Their total fertility rates in 2005 were respectively 1.39 and 1.34 children per woman. This has been a long-term trend in Germany, where the fertility rate had already fallen below 1.5 in 1975 (Dorbritz, 2008). The phenomenon is more recent in Russia, where the rapid fall in fertility began in the late 1980s[3], a consequence of the deterioration in economic conditions and a more radical shift in attitudes to the family. Another difference is that Germany is one of the countries where the rate of childless women is one of the highest in the world, whereas this figure is low in France and Russia. France's fertility rate is relatively high, compared with other European countries (1.94 in 2005). France and Germany share a relatively late and increasing age at first birth (Table 1). This age is lower in Russia, but the formation of the family, whether a couple or the first child, has been increasingly postponed since the late 1980s.

Table 1: Key figures for France, Germany and Russia

	France	Germany	Russia
Total fertility rate	1.94	1.39	1.35
Mean age at first birth	27.7	28.2	24
GDP per capita	30,386	29,461	10,845
Unemployment rate (1996-2005)	9.8	11.1	7.8
Female participation rate (25-54) in 2003	79.3	77.8	74.6 (16-54)
Gender-related Development Index (rank)	7	22	58
Gender Empowerment Measure (rank)	18	28	71

[2] The population of France is slightly higher than that of the United Kingdom and Italy.

[3] The fertility rate was 2.23 children per woman in 1987.

The three countries are also quite different in living standards. France and Germany are among the countries with the highest per capita GDP (ranking 18th and 20th in the world in 2005), while Russia ranks lower (52nd). However, the unemployment rate is lower in Russia (average 7.8% in 1996-2005, compared with 9.8% for France and 11.1% for Germany).

Russia has a long tradition of female employment that was ideologically supported in the USSR: from the 1940s the overwhelming majority of women worked for pay at state enterprises or collective farms. In spite of a decline in female employment after transition, the level of female participation is still high today. During the economic transformations, the rates of female economic activity and employment remained at quite high levels. In Russia in 2005, the labour force participation rate of the 15-72 population was 61.5%, including 66.1% of the male population and 57.5% of the female; and of the population 16-54/59 years old, 71.3%, including 73.3% of males aged 16-59 and 69.3% of females aged 16-54. As male employment rates are lower in Russia than in many European countries, the difference between the employment rates of men and women in Russia is less than in many other countries (Katz, 2008). The two-earner household is still the predominant norm in contemporary Russia, even if men are considered as primary breadwinners and women as second earners (Katz, 2008). Furthermore, women's participation rate fell particularly fast for the mothers of pre-school children during the transition period.

The activity rate of French adult women started to rise for cohorts born after the mid-1950s, and today most French women work. The level of female paid employment is high: in 2005, the activity rate of women aged 15-59 was 76.5%[4]. This increase in women's labour force participation occurred irrespective of the number of children: from 1985 to 2002, it rose from 72% to 84% for women with one child, from 66% to 80% for women with 2 children and from 45% to 63% for those with 3 children. Most women continue to work while having children; their employment is less often disrupted by childbearing than in other continental European countries. Nevertheless, motherhood is still associated with withdrawal from the labour market for some groups of women (Anxo *et al.,* 2006; Pailhé and Solaz, 2006). Working mothers of young children are socially well accepted, both by individuals and by firms, whereas the "housewife" model has become socially discredited. Attitudes towards female work have changed dramatically: according to CREDOC opinion surveys, in 1978, 41% of French people thought that women should not work while their children were young. This figure fell to 17% in 2004. More than 60% think that women should have the free choice of working or not. So the dominant model is the two-career one: among couples aged 20-49

[4] The female employment rate is lower than activity rate, as the latter includes unemployed women (see below).

where at least one partner has a job, both partners have jobs in 70% of cases; the man is the sole earner in 25% of couples; the woman is the sole earner in 5% of couples (Eurostat, Labour Force Survey).

In Germany, women's participation in the labour market is slightly lower than in France. Having a child affects the difference in participation between the two countries. The participation rate is higher for childless German women (Figure 1). On the other hand, women with children are more often economically inactive in Germany and many have part-time jobs (particularly in the old West Germany). The model of the wife as homemaker is still very popular, particularly in the West.

Figure 1:



Women's participation rate responds to economic imperatives, and also differing forms of family policy. German family policy is based on the traditional male breadwinner model. Women are largely forced to choose between family and work, and leave the labour market when a child is born (Dorbritz, 2008). Until 2006[5], parental leave was strongly encouraged: it is granted irrespective of occupation before the birth; this makes it a sort of "maternal wage" for mothers' domestic work and parenting. Some 75% of German women take this leave and 50% stay at home until the child is three years old. There are very few facilities for the care of younger children. In the former West Germany, only 4% of under-threes attend a public or private crèche, and 64% of three-to-six-year-olds attend kindergartens. Although local authorities have been obliged since 1996 to provide every child with a kindergarten place,

[5] Since 2006, a number of steps have been taken to develop childcare rather than parental leave, such as the possibility of deducting childcare expenses from taxable income.

the objective has not been achieved, for both financial and ideological reasons. Furthermore, the opening hours of crèches, kindergartens and schools reduce mothers' availability for full-time paid work. But family policy does include generous allowances.

Whereas German society has some misgivings about the early collective socialisation of children, France has a long tradition of State action in this area. The State tends to stand in for families, with the aim of social equity as well as encouraging fertility (Rosental, 2003). French family policy is a compromise between promoting families and promoting the work-family balance and women's employment. For example, the whole policy used to be based on the male breadwinner and female caregiver pattern, but the development of kindergartens, introduced at the same time, was meant to promote equal opportunities among French children. Since the 1980s, this policy has accommodated the massive arrival of women on the labour market. Collective and private care arrangements were developed for children under three, helping women to reconcile family and work (Toulemon *et al.,* 2008). Unlike in Northern European countries, this type of care is available immediately after the end of maternity leave, i.e. from the age of two or three months, and the hours are extensive: on week-days from 7:00 or 8:00 to 18:00 or 19:00. In 1994, family policy came to a turning point. The family policy reform, adopted against a background of high unemployment, adopted the opposite philosophy, by creating incentives to leave the labour force. The *Allocation parentale d'éducation* (APE) was designed to allow one of the parents (in practice the mother) to devote themselves entirely to bringing up the newborn child until its third birthday. It is estimated that this leave has been an incentive to labour force withdrawal for a significant number of mothers, especially the less educated. Finally, according to a recent survey on child care, on weekdays, 61% of children under three are cared for mainly by their parents, 21% by subsidised child-minders, 10% in a crèche, 7% by their grand-parents or family and 1% by nannies at home (Blanpain, 2006; Ruault and Daniel, 2003). Of children aged two, 37% were enrolled in *écoles maternelles* (kindergartens), 97% at age 3, although this is not compulsory (Blanpain, 2006). To sum up, France has a favourable context for reconciling work and family by relatively comprehensive and continuous support through a combination of subsidised private and public providers, parental leave and allowances.

In Russia, public expenditure on the family was severely cut back during the transition period (Ovcharova and Popova, 2005)[6]. The level of allowances is very low, has not been indexed on inflation and has not taken account of the increasing cost of childbearing. Parental leave

[6] According to the estimates of Ovcharova and Popova (2005), the share of family and maternity benefits in all state funds directed to payment of social benefits decreased from 77.3% in 1991 to 32.4% in 2003.

is paid for children under eighteen months, but at a fairly low rate (40% of average mother's salary, up to 6,000 roubles a month [€160-180]). Additional parental leave is available until the child is three, but is not paid. The provision of childcare facilities also deteriorated during the transition period. The proportion of one-to-six-year-olds in crèches or kindergartens fell from 66% in 1990 to 58% in 1998 and 54% in 2003. The number of children on waiting lists for preschool institutions was four times higher in 2004 than in 1999 (Goskomstat 1999; 2004).

The three countries also differ markedly in company practices for reconciling work and family life. The provision of childcare by companies is relatively sparse in all three (Figure 2). It is slightly higher in Russia, a relic of the communist period (11% of employees work in companies that provide childcare). More employees in France enjoy flexible working hours (44%) than in Russia and Germany (resp. 29% and 25%) (Figure 2). However, part-time work for women is fairly developed in Germany and very rare in Russia.

As we saw above, the formal provision of childcare is more highly developed in France than in the other two countries. Among parents of young children, 38% receive formal childcare support in France, compared with 31% in Germany and 28% in Russia. Informal provision is also more developed in France.

Figure 2: Provision of childcare and time arrangements by companies



Source: GGS, Wave 1

Sample: Wage earners

4. Method

4.1. Data and sample

The data used come from Wave 1 of the Gender and Generation Survey, carried out in Russia in 2004 and France and Germany in 2005, of people aged 18 to 79. The survey,

coordinated by the Population Activity Unit of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, examines determining factors for individual demographic behaviour, with a focus on intergenerational and gender relations. It is a multidisciplinary survey, covering economic, sociological and psychological factors (Vikat *et al.,* 2007). In addition to its retrospective view of behaviour, the survey includes a prospective approach and it is for that reason that it will comprise three waves. Not only is a wide spectrum of dimensions studied, but the survey presents the advantage of enabling comparison between countries. The questionnaire was designed by an international group of researchers, and each country was supposed to use the standard questionnaire.

Much of the questionnaire concerns fertility, seen both retrospectively and prospectively. The precise timing of births is recorded and a number of questions address fertility intentions. The survey question we have used is the following: "Do you intend to have a/another child during the next 3 years?" Four responses were possible:

1. Definitely yes
2. Probably yes
3. Probably not
4. Definitely not

The question was asked of men and women under 50, whether or not they were living as a couple. It was filtered for people certain of being infertile (or whose spouse was). The French questionnaire was slightly different in structure. To avoid redundancy, this question was filtered for those who had earlier stated that they did not want any children at all[7]. We have assumed the response "definitely not" for the respondents thus filtered. We compare these intentions with occupational status. Sections 8 and 9 of the questionnaire address the detailed occupational situation of the respondent and their spouse. The population of reference used is men and women of 18 to 45. The upper age limit was lowered to 45 because the likelihood that older women would have fertility intentions is very slight in these three countries. The research covers people living as a couple (whether married or not, cohabiting or not). This selection was made in order to have the most realistic intentions possible and to prevent the statement being affected by prospects of forming a couple in the next three years.

The literature long mainly addressed women's fertility intentions, on the underlying assumption that women are the main drivers of fertility. However, it is not only women's

[7] In the standard questionnaire, this question came later.

characteristics but also men's that may influence fertility intentions (Mills *et al.,* 2008). It is instructive to examine men's fertility intentions and to see whether occupational status operates in the same way for men and women. Furthermore, we analyse how a spouse's occupational status affects a person's intentions. Qualitative research into intentions has shown that individuals integrate their spouse's position in the formulation of their intentions (Bernardi et al., 2007). We examine whether the inclusion of the spouse's characteristics modifies the effect of an individual's characteristics.

The sample sizes are given in Table 2.

Table 2. Sample size

	Women	Men
France	1,896	1,307
Germany	1,242	845
Russia	1,904	1,415

4.2. Dependent variables and statistical method

The dependent variable is constructed from the response to the question about intentions of having a child in the next three years. "Definitely not" and "probably not" were taken together as negative responses, and "definitely yes" and "probably yes" as positive.

We analyse the intentions of having a/another child in the next three years using a series of logistic regressions. Considerations that affect the decision to have the first child differ from those that affect the following births. So we estimate a first model for childless men and childless women respectively, and then a second model for mothers and fathers. Men and women are analysed separately, since the determinants of intentions for men and women differ because the job characteristic effect on intentions is likely to differ by gender (and we have tested that it is significantly different).

4.3. Explanatory variables and specific sample

The variables of interest here are of two sorts: stability of employment and consequently of occupational status, and work-family policies in a particular job.

The various types of occupational status used in Model 1 are as follows: student, unemployed or inactive, permanently employed, temporarily employed, on parental leave (for intentions of having a further child). Model 2 adds a variable indicating whether the spouse is unemployed. The sample used for the estimates is the full sample of people between 18 and 45 living as couples in each country.

The indicators of work-family policies used in Model 3 are as follows:

- Possibility of having flexible work arrangements;
- Having a part-time contract;
- Availability of childcare provided by the workplace (its own or partner's workplace).

In the model concerning those who already have children, two variables are added for the use of formal or informal childcare arrangements. The regressions apply to the population of those in paid work.

4.4 Control variables

In addition to the variables of interest described above, we control for a set of socio-demographic variables which have been shown to correlate with fertility intentions. They are the following: respondent's age and age difference between spouses. Marital status is included, since in some countries marriage is related to parenthood. For parents, the number of children and the age of the youngest are added.

Some economic variables are included: educational qualifications (below secondary, secondary completed and higher than secondary) and housing conditions. Satisfaction with current accommodation is measured on a scale of 1 to 10. Variables relating to type of employment are included in the specification of work-family policies: public or private sector, and occupation. Public employees have more secure and protected jobs than private employees, and jobs in the public sector more often have the opportunity of flexible work arrangements.

An indicator of more traditional values is included, namely religious attendance. The more religious are more likely to want children. A person is considered to be religious if they attend a religious service at least twelve times a year. Lastly, the number of the respondent's own siblings is a good indicator of a desire for children (Axinn *et al.,* 1994).

5. Results

5.1. Descriptive statistics

Responses on fertility intentions vary according to whether or not respondents already have children (Table 3), which confirms the need to examine first parenthood and extending the family separately. Childless women express fairly high fertility intentions. However, the distribution of those who intend to have children in the next three years varies considerably between countries. More than half of childless women in Russia and France wish to have a child, but only 38% in Germany. This desire is particularly strong in Russia, where more than

six out of ten childless women express it. Differences between countries are less marked for women who already have children. Those in France are the most numerous in expressing a fertility intention. Differences between countries can also be found among men, who in each country are less numerous than women to want a child when they do not already have one, and slightly more numerous than women when they do.

Table 3. Fertility intentions among men and women

Men	Childless			With Children		
	France	Germany	Russia	France	Germany	Russia
definitely yes	26.5	14.1	22.9	12.1	6.0	6.8
probably yes	21.2	20.7	31.5	11.7	9.5	17.9
probably not	17.5	20.5	22.0	3.9	10.0	21.8
definitely not	34.8	44.8	23.6	72.3	74.5	53.5
Women	Childless			With children		
	France	Germany	Russia	France	Germany	Russia
definitely yes	28.9	20.1	28.5	12.2	7.6	5.2
probably yes	22.9	18.3	33.9	10.1	6.8	13.6
probably not	17.0	19.8	19.2	3.7	11.3	20.8
definitely not	31.2	41.8	18.5	74.0	74.3	60.4

Source: GGS, Wave 1

One survey question concerns the relationship between fertility intentions and the availability of childcare. It emerges that the possibility of having childcare is a key factor in fertility intentions among men and women (Figure 3), particularly in Russia and Germany (resp. 46% and 34% of childless women consider that this is a major factor in their intentions of having a child). This concern for childcare persists among women with children in Russia. It is of slightly less importance for men than for women. There is also a negative correlation between the concern for the availability of childcare and stated intentions: those most concerned about childcare express the lowest fertility intentions.

Figure 3: How much the fertility decision depends on availability of childcare



Source: GGS, Wave 1

5.2. Work stability

Table 4 presents the results of the regressions for childless men and women. Model 1 only includes variables relating to the respondent, and Model 2 includes a variable relating to the spouse's occupational status. The full results are given in Appendix 1.

The effect of occupational status varies among the three countries. Women with less stable jobs have lower fertility intentions in France and Germany. In these countries, the hypothesis that people postpone fertility because of the instability of their employment appears to be

confirmed; women wait to have a permanent job before thinking of having children. Similarly, in France, being unemployed has a negative effect on the fertility intentions of childless women.

In Russia, however, having a temporary job or being unemployed increases fertility intentions. This result may confirm the hypothesis of a withdrawal into the world of the family due to economic difficulties in that country. Another interpretation would be the particular nature of temporary jobs in Russia. These jobs are mainly found in new private sector companies. They may be much better paid than permanent jobs in the public sector. The income effect may be positive for fertility intentions. Young women more often have this type of job. These jobs are also more frequent in small companies, which offer little guarantee of continued employment in the case of pregnancy or after a birth. The higher fertility intentions may in practice reflect past intentions that were unfulfilled because of employment constraints. Women with permanent jobs in major State enterprises or the public sector, which do guarantee continued employment in the case of pregnancy, can fulfil their intentions when they wish. This is similar to the interpretation given by Sinyavskaya *et al.* (2007) concerning women with university degrees, who have fewer children than others; they delay childbearing decisions more than less qualified women, but they express higher fertility intentions than other groups.

The spouse's occupational status affects childless women's fertility intentions in France and Russia. In these countries, if the spouse is not working, that reduces women's fertility intentions. In Germany, however, the spouse's occupational status does not have an effect and only the woman's status appears to be a factor. The addition of the spouse's occupational status variable makes the parameter of the woman's occupational status non-significant in France, showing that it is more the man's unemployment that affects intentions than the woman's.

Among men, being unemployed has a negative effect on intentions for first parenthood in Russia and France. However, having a temporary job has none. Their partner's occupational status has no effect, except in France, where men reduce their fertility intentions if their spouse is not working. French men appear to have realised that their spouses want to have a stable job before having a child.

Although occupational status affects intentions for a first child, it does not affect intentions of having later children. All the coefficients are non-significant. Employment status affects entry in parenthood, but has no effect on the intention to have another child. It may also be explained by the lower unstable jobs and unemployment status for people having children. For women in Russia, having an unemployed partner continues to impact negatively the

intentions of having a further child, which shows that the man's economic situation is a determining factor in that country.

Table 4: Regression results for intention for a first child by work stability

	Women			Men		
	France	Germany	Russia	France	Germany	Russia
non permanent job	-	-	(+)	ns	ns	ns
permanent job	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
unemployed/OLF	(-)	ns	(+)	(-)	ns	-
student	-	-	ns	-	-	-
Non working partner	-	ns	-	-	ns	ns
N	619	301	323	411	348	358

Source: GGS, Wave 1

( ): The level of significativity varies depending on the introduction of partner's employment status

ns: not significant at the 10% level

Table 5: Regression results for intention for a further child by work stability

	Women			Men		
	France	Germany	Russia	France	Germany	Russia
non permanent job	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	+
permanent job	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.	ref.
unemployed	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
OLF/student	ns	ns	ns			
parental leave	ns	ns	ns			
Non working partner	ns	ns	-	ns	ns	ns
N	1277	941	1581	896	497	1057

Source: GGS, Wave 1

ns: not significant at the 10% level

5.3. Family friendly policies

Table 6 presents the effects of family-friendly policies on fertility intentions. The regressions cover employed persons and are calculated from a pooled sample, with the addition of country indicators. This provides a sufficient number for assessing the effect of those family-friendly policies that concern only a small number of employees (such as childcare by employer).

The effect of family-friendly policies on fertility intentions is less clear than that of employment status. Flexibility in working hours does have some positive effect on the intention to have a first child, but significance levels are low. A separate analysis by country shows that flexibility in working hours is only significant in Germany. The low range of opening hours of crèches and schools in this country may explain this positive effect of informal agreements on time schedule on fertility intentions. On the other hand, having a part-time job reduces fertility plans of childless women and men. This may be explained by the wide diversity of part-time jobs. As proposed by an employer, these jobs are often non-permanent with irregular, split-shift hours. When it is the employee who seeks such a job, it is more transitional and the employee has a greater choice of hours. In the case of the childless, these jobs are more likely a way of increasing flexibility for employers than a way to achieve a better work-family balance. Childcare by the employer has a positive effect on intentions to have a first child, among both men and women. This relatively rare facility does therefore encourage fertility. It thus seems perceived as a good way to balance family and work. In the case of women, it does not affect their intentions to have a further child. It may be that it is not so much the possibility of a crèche place that is important as actually gaining a place. Moreover, access to formal childcare is not significant either on the intention to have another child.

Table 6: Regression results for intention for a child by family-friendly policy

	Childless		With children	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
flexible work schedule	(+)	ns	ns	ns
part-time	-	-	ns	ns
chilcare by employer	+	+	ns	+
insitutional childcare			ns	ns
informal childcare			-	ns

Source: GGS, Wave 1

Intentions to have a first child depend on the status in the labour market and, to a lesser extent, on actions of firms to reconcile family and work. Intentions to have another child depend to a larger extent on demographic and cultural factors. They depend strongly on the number of children achieved: having two children is still positive on fertility intentions in France and to a lesser extent in Germany while one child seems the optimal size in Russia. Other demographic factors such as age and the age gap between spouses have also a strong effect on fertility plans. Norms and familial heritage have also a large effect on the intentions to have additional children. Thus, religiosity and the number of siblings act positively on fertility plans. Having a larger family depend also on the type of job hold, which may be a proxy of income.

Conclusion

This article examines the effect of employment on fertility intentions. It focuses on two aspects of the employment relationship that may affect fertility: stability of employment and the possibility of reconciling work and family. A comparative study of France, Germany and Russia is undertaken, since these countries have differing demographic, institutional and economic contexts.

The results show that insecure employment has a negative effect on the desire among women for a first child in France and Germany, but a positive one in Russia. The effect is negative for men. However, the effect of employment instability disappears with respect to the intention to have a further child. This may be an age effect: unstable jobs and unemployment mainly affect the young when they enter the labour market.

Family-friendly policies have a less clear effect on fertility intentions, and, here too, it is mainly on the intention to have a first child. The weak effects observed on the intention to have a further child may be due to the limitation of the sample to women with a job, or the fact that they have achieved the desired family size. However, the results show that childcare provided by the employer does have a positive effect on intentions. Flexible hours have little effect, except in Germany, where they are sought because school and kindergarten hours are highly inflexible. The weak effects may also be due to the diversity of policies practised.

Intentions may change over time and may also not be achieved (Monnier, 1989; Morgan, 2003). It is consequently useful to examine the factors that mean that the intentions are not achieved or change. The data from GGS Wave 2 will enable us to study various behaviours, in particular in the transition between first and subsequent children. We shall then see

whether fertility intentions are achieved, whether there is a gap between intentions and reality, and whether employment status and family-friendly policies affect the achievement of these intentions.

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Appendix 1a: **Regression results for intention for a child by work stability**

France, childless people

	Childless Women				Childless Men			
	Modèle 1		Modèle 2		Modèle 1		Modèle 2	
	Coef.	*T stat*	Coef.	*T stat*	Coef.	*T stat*	Coef.	*T stat*
religious	-0,403	*-0,91*	-0,380	*-0,85*	0,607	*1,12*	0,889	*1,61*
French nationality	-0,061	*-0,12*	-0,081	*-0,16*	-0,225	*-0,42*	-0,163	*-0,30*
# siblings	0,175 ***	*2,91*	0,175 ***	*2,89*	0,045	*0,69*	0,056	*0,84*
<25	-1,074 ***	*-2,93*	-1,001 ***	*-2,72*	-1,981 ***	*-4,83*	-1,791 ***	*-4,28*
25-29	-0,031	*-0,08*	-0,017	*-0,04*	-0,832 **	*-2,28*	-0,815 **	*-2,19*
Ref:30-34								
35-39	-1,119 *	*-2,43*	-1,067 **	*-2,31*	-1,997 ***	*-4,11*	-2,125 ***	*-4,30*
40+	-3,037 ***	*-6,00*	-2,962 ***	*-5,83*	-2,135 ***	*-4,19*	-2,257 ***	*-4,37*
married	0,959 ***	*3,09*	0,922 ***	*2,97*	0,588 *	*1,73*	0,557 *	*1,64*
primary education	-0,789 ***	*-2,22*	-0,751 ***	*-2,09*	0,174	*0,41*	0,241	*0,55*
secondary education	-0,230	*-1,12*	-0,212	*-1,02*	0,623 **	*2,39*	0,655 ***	*2,47*
ref: tertiary education								
Temporary job	-0,480 *	*-1,80*	-0,450 *	*-1,68*	-0,131	*-0,38*	0,040	*0,11*
Ref: stable job								
unemployed	-0,570 *	*-1,74*	-0,484	*-1,46*	-0,805 **	*-2,18*	-0,597	*-1,57*
student	-1,591 ***	*-5,82*	-1,413 ***	*-5,01*	-1,625 ***	*-3,75*	-1,158 ***	*-2,53*
Non working partner			-0,620 ***	*-2,54*			-0,971 ***	*-3,57*
Quality of housing	-0,038	*-0,68*	-0,051	*-0,88*	-0,026	*-0,42*	-0,028	*-0,46*
Men 2 years + younger	1,107 *	*1,92*	1,079 *	*1,89*	-0,152	*-0,39*	-0,182	*-0,47*
Ref: same age								
Women 2 years +	0,017	*0,09*	-0,065	*-0,33*	-0,080	*-0,31*	0,091	*0,34*
Intercept	1,516 **	*2,02*	1,691 **	*2,22*	1,433 *	*1,86*	1,510 *	*1,92*
N	619		619		411		411	
Pseudo R2	21,3		22,0		17,9		20,2	

France, people with children

	Women with children				Men with children			
	Modèle 1		Modèle 2		Modèle 1		Modèle 2	
	Coef.	*T stat*	Coef.	*T stat*	Coef.	*T stat*	Coef.	*T stat*
religious	0,395	*1,30*	0,386	*1,27*	0,890 **	*2,40*	0,901 **	*2,43*
French nationality	-0,002	*-0,01*	-0,015	*-0,05*	-0,484	*-1,41*	-0,486	*-1,41*
# siblings	0,109 ***	*2,90*	0,109 ***	*2,90*	0,015	*0,30*	0,015	*0,32*
<25	0,032	*0,08*	0,042	*0,11*	-2,023 **	*-2,28*	-1,988 **	*-2,23*
25-29	0,676 ***	*2,55*	0,675 ***	*2,55*	0,348	*1,00*	0,373	*1,07*
Ref:30-34								
35-39	-0,801 ***	*-3,64*	-0,805 ***	*-3,66*	-0,723 ***	*-2,88*	-0,727 ***	*-2,89*
40+	-2,053 ***	*-6,12*	-2,053 ***	*-6,11*	-0,998 ***	*-2,94*	-1,014 ***	*-2,99*
1 child	2,808 ***	*9,44*	2,804 ***	*9,42*	2,546 ***	*7,88*	2,515 ***	*7,74*
2 children	1,065 ***	*3,89*	1,062 ***	*3,88*	0,576 *	*1,91*	0,545 *	*1,80*
ref: 3 children+								
age youngest child	-0,090 ***	*-3,50*	-0,089 ***	*-3,47*	-0,221 ***	*-6,31*	-0,223 ***	*-6,34*
married	0,069	*0,37*	0,069	*0,37*	0,071	*0,32*	0,060	*0,26*
primary education	-0,276	*-0,94*	-0,268	*-0,91*	-0,445	*-1,38*	-0,413	*-1,27*
secondary education	-0,300	*-1,52*	-0,299	*-1,52*	-0,677 ***	*-2,90*	-0,667 ***	*-2,84*
ref: tertiary education								
Temporary job	0,474	*1,57*	0,483	*1,60*	0,421	*1,16*	0,417	*1,15*
Ref: stable job								
unemployed	0,388	*1,30*	0,418	*1,37*	0,353	*0,95*	0,363	*0,98*
OLF/student	0,283	*1,03*	0,285	*1,04*				
Parental leave	-0,046	*-0,14*	-0,048	*-0,15*				
Non working partner			-0,159	*-0,46*			-0,193	*-0,85*
Quality of housing	-0,036	*-0,80*	-0,040	*-0,87*	-0,004	*-0,07*	-0,009	*-0,16*
Men 2 years + younger	0,716 **	*2,07*	0,721 **	*2,09*	0,016	*0,05*	0,030	*0,09*
Ref: same age								
Women 2 years +	-0,289	*-1,62*	-0,283	*-1,59*	0,346	*1,50*	0,366	*1,58*
Intercept	-1,651 ***	*-2,79*	-1,607 ***	*-2,68*	-0,408	*-0,60*	-0,289	*-0,41*
N	1277		1277		896		896	
Pseudo R2	31,9		32,0		34,4		34,5	

Russia, childless people

	Women without children				Men without children			
	Modèle 1		Modèle 2		Modèle 1		Modèle 2	
	Coef.	*T stat*	Coef.	*T stat*	Coef.	*T stat*	Coef.	*T stat*
religious	0,335	*0,90*	0,313	*0,83*	0,102	*0,23*	0,083	*0,18*
# siblings	0,046	*0,36*	0,048	*0,38*	-0,012	*-0,12*	-0,007	*-0,08*
<25	-1,125 *	*-1,70*	-1,073	*-1,61*	0,622	*1,52*	0,715 *	*1,69*
25-29	-0,806	*-1,19*	-0,834	*-1,22*	1,464 ***	*3,37*	1,493 ***	*3,41*
Ref:30-34								
35-39	-1,621 **	*-1,97*	-1,534 *	*-1,84*	0,501	*0,90*	0,514	*0,92*
40+	-3,821 ***	*-3,72*	-3,886 ***	*-3,75*	-1,246 **	*-2,10*	-1,255 **	*-2,10*
married	0,881 **	*2,39*	0,842 ***	*2,27*	0,726 **	*2,28*	0,721 **	*2,26*
primary education	-0,799 *	*-1,72*	-0,836 *	*-1,78*	-0,407	*-1,02*	-0,431	*-1,08*
secondary education	-0,010	*-0,03*	-0,012	*-0,04*	-0,107	*-0,39*	-0,102	*-0,37*
ref: tertiary education								
Temporary job	0,611	*1,60*	0,704 *	*1,81*	-0,064	*-0,21*	-0,036	*-0,12*
Ref: stable job								
unemployed	0,663	*1,60*	0,707 *	*1,70*	-0,553	*-1,43*	-0,518	*-1,33*
student	-0,567	*-1,62*	-0,368	*-1,00*	-1,096 ***	*-2,89*	-1,005 ***	*-2,58*
Non working partner			-0,681 **	*-1,99*			-0,277	*-1,03*
Quality of housing	-0,074	*-1,61*	-0,068	*-1,47*	-0,097 **	*-2,14*	-0,099 **	*-2,19*
Men 2 years + younger	0,508	*0,69*	0,479	*0,64*	-0,332	*-0,86*	-0,356	*-0,92*
Ref: same age								
Women 2 years +	0,280	*1,03*	0,144	*0,51*	0,869 ***	*2,95*	0,919 ***	*3,07*
Intercept	1,724 **	*2,41*	1,827 ***	*2,53*	0,197	*0,36*	0,235	*0,43*
N	321		321		357		357	
Pseudo R2	11,2		12,1		15,4		15,6	

Russia, people with children

	Women with children				Men with children			
	Modèle 1		Modèle 2		Modèle 1		Modèle 2	
	Coef.	*T stat*	Coef.	*T stat*	Coef.	*T stat*	Coef.	*T stat*
religious	0,464 **	*2,00*	0,450 *	*1,93*	0,789 ***	*2,71*	0,774 ***	*2,65*
# siblings	-0,048	*-0,74*	-0,044	*-0,68*	0,224 ***	*4,12*	0,218 ***	*3,99*
<25	0,356	*1,24*	0,346	*1,20*	-0,676 *	*-1,77*	-0,738 *	*-1,92*
25-29	0,581 ***	*2,79*	0,558 ***	*2,67*	-0,269	*-1,11*	-0,296	*-1,21*
Ref:30-34								
35-39	-1,277 ***	*-4,67*	-1,298 ***	*-4,73*	-0,926 ***	*-3,90*	-0,925 ***	*-3,89*
40+	-1,884 ***	*-5,49*	-1,896 ***	*-5,50*	-2,051 ***	*-6,74*	-2,058 ***	*-6,76*
married	-0,186	*-1,06*	-0,197	*-1,13*	-0,366 *	*-1,77*	-0,356 *	*-1,72*
1 child	2,037 ***	*3,32*	2,002 ***	*3,26*	1,455 ***	*4,00*	1,480 ***	*4,06*
2 children	0,102	*0,16*	0,054	*0,09*	-0,298	*-0,79*	-0,278	*-0,73*
ref: 3 children+								
age youngest child	0,009	*0,40*	0,009	*0,39*	-0,003	*-0,12*	-0,001	*-0,04*
primary education	-0,379	*-1,39*	-0,373	*-1,36*	-0,574 **	*-2,36*	-0,579 **	*-2,37*
secondary education	-0,195	*-1,16*	-0,176	*-1,04*	-0,547 ***	*-2,87*	-0,552 ***	*-2,88*
ref: tertiary education								
Temporary job	0,219	*1,00*	0,215	*0,98*	0,501 ***	*2,74*	0,504 ***	*2,75*
Ref: stable job								
unemployed	-0,314	*-0,87*	-0,295	*-0,81*	0,220	*0,75*	0,186	*0,63*
OLF/student	-0,014	*-0,06*	-0,017	*-0,08*				
Parental leave	-0,303	*-1,19*	-0,320	*-1,25*				
Non working partner			-0,495 *	*-1,87*			0,298	*1,48*
Quality of housing	0,055 **	*2,09*	0,055 **	*2,06*	0,002	*0,08*	0,004	*0,14*
Men 2 years + younger	0,279	*0,98*	0,273	*0,95*	-0,595 *	*-1,86*	-0,590 *	*-1,85*
Ref: same age								
Women 2 years +	-0,336 **	*-2,12*	-0,329 **	*-2,07*	0,522 ***	*2,93*	0,506 ***	*2,83*
Intercept	-2,492 ***	*-3,65*	-2,398 ***	*-3,50*	-1,208 ***	*-2,45*	-1,289 ***	*-2,59*
N	1577		1577		1055		1055	
Pseudo R2	24,8		25,0		20,9		21,1	

Germany, childless people

	Women without children				Men without children			
	Modèle 1		Modèle 2		Modèle 1		Modèle 2	
	Coef.	*T stat*	Coef.	*T stat*	Coef.	*T stat*	Coef.	*T stat*
religious	0,241	*0,57*	0,208	*0,49*	0,647	*1,56*	0,657	*1,59*
German nationality	-0,381	*-1,00*	-0,370	*-0,97*	0,074	*0,18*	0,046	*0,11*
# siblings	0,095	*0,89*	0,104	*0,96*	0,215 **	*1,99*	0,218 **	*2,01*
<25	-0,534	*-1,21*	-0,485	*-1,09*	-0,640	*-1,58*	-0,490	*-1,15*
25-29	0,312	*0,71*	0,332	*0,75*	0,035	*0,09*	0,102	*0,26*
Ref:30-34	-1,832 ***	*-3,23*	-1,829 ***	*-3,21*	-0,891 *	*-1,91*	-0,918 **	*-1,96*
35-39	-4,529 ***	*-4,11*	-4,530 ***	*-4,10*	-2,088 ***	*-4,16*	-2,097 ***	*-4,17*
married	1,160 ***	*3,02*	1,135 ***	*2,95*	0,695 *	*1,93*	0,680 *	*1,90*
primary education	0,068	*0,13*	0,063	*0,12*	-1,492 ***	*-2,47*	-1,427 ***	*-2,36*
secondary education	-0,395	*-1,12*	-0,391	*-1,11*	-0,628 **	*-2,02*	-0,592 **	*-1,89*
ref: tertiary education								
Temporary job	-0,913 **	*-2,16*	-0,896 **	*-2,11*	-0,211	*-0,66*	-0,177	*-0,54*
Ref: stable job								
unemployed	-0,338	*-0,77*	-0,328	*-0,74*	-0,329	*-0,83*	-0,285	*-0,71*
student	-1,353 ***	*-3,03*	-1,259 ***	*-2,76*	-1,901 ***	*-4,28*	-1,794 ***	*-3,96*
Non working partner			-0,328	*-0,97*			-0,353	*-1,16*
Quality of housing	-0,095	*-1,57*	-0,093	*-1,54*	-0,037	*-0,64*	-0,035	*-0,61*
Men 2 years + younger	-0,977	*-1,36*	-0,946	*-1,32*	0,266	*0,60*	0,244	*0,55*
Ref: same age								
Women 2 years + younger	-0,414	*-1,45*	-0,467	*-1,60*	0,768 ***	*2,76*	0,806 ***	*2,86*
Intercept	1,584 **	*2,02*	1,616 **	*2,06*	0,137	*0,18*	0,158	*0,21*
N	301		301		348		348	
Pseudo R2	20,3		20,5		17,0		17,3	

Germany, people with children

	Women with children				Men with children			
	Modèle 1		Modèle 2		Modèle 1		Modèle 2	
	Coef.	*T stat*	Coef.	*T stat*	Coef.	*T stat*	Coef.	*T stat*
religious	0,991 ***	*3,30*	0,960 ***	*3,19*	-0,043	*-0,09*	-0,038	*-0,08*
German nationality	-0,192	*-0,67*	-0,218	*-0,76*	-1,024 ***	*-2,53*	-1,031 **	*-2,54*
# siblings	0,059	*0,80*	0,069	*0,92*	0,048	*0,51*	0,051	*0,53*
<25	-1,019 **	*-2,19*	-0,929 **	*-1,97*	0,575	*0,72*	0,596	*0,74*
25-29	-0,137	*-0,44*	-0,118	*-0,38*	1,064 **	*2,07*	1,071 **	*2,08*
Ref:30-34								
35-39	-1,159 ***	*-3,55*	-1,180 ***	*-3,61*	-0,810 *	*-1,86*	-0,808 *	*-1,85*
40+	-2,549 ***	*-4,51*	-2,591 ***	*-4,56*	-1,334 ***	*-2,57*	-1,343 ***	*-2,58*
1 child	2,834 ***	*5,75*	2,839 ***	*5,78*	3,488 ***	*3,99*	3,481 ***	*3,98*
2 children	0,898 *	*1,87*	0,890 *	*1,86*	1,409 *	*1,64*	1,406	*1,63*
ref: 3 children+								
age youngest child	-0,158 ***	*-3,92*	-0,156 ***	*-3,87*	-0,213 ***	*-3,87*	-0,215 ***	*-3,84*
married	-0,124	*-0,39*	-0,184	*-0,57*	0,952 *	*1,73*	0,966 *	*1,74*
primary education	-0,584	*-1,45*	-0,570	*-1,41*	-0,244	*-0,40*	-0,240	*-0,40*
secondary education	-0,773 **	*-2,77*	-0,801 ***	*-2,85*	-0,817 **	*-2,15*	-0,822 **	*-2,16*
ref: tertiary education								
Temporary job	0,270	*0,73*	0,280	*0,75*	0,154	*0,34*	0,157	*0,35*
Ref: stable job								
unemployed	0,379	*0,72*	0,466	*0,88*	0,081	*0,16*	0,079	*0,15*
OLF/student	0,212	*0,67*	0,247	*0,77*				
Parental leave	0,326	*0,92*	0,328	*0,93*				
Non working partner			-0,477	*-1,25*			-0,069	*-0,19*
Quality of housing	-0,028	*-0,55*	-0,029	*-0,56*	0,080	*1,12*	0,079	*1,12*
Men 2 years + younger	0,688	*1,34*	0,747	*1,45*	-0,232	*-0,34*	-0,235	*-0,35*
Ref: same age								
Women 2 years + younger	-0,057	*-0,24*	-0,061	*-0,25*	0,081	*0,23*	0,086	*0,24*
Intercept	-1,446 *	*-1,84*	-1,346 *	*-1,71*	-3,071 **	*-2,41*	-3,034 **	*-2,35*
N	941		941		497		497	
Pseudo R2								
	34,0		34,2		40,5		40,5	

Appendix 2a: **Regression results for intention for a first child by family-friendly policy (logit)**

	Working men without children		Working women without children	
	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat
Ref: France				
Russia	0.465 ***	2.63	0.087	0.49
Germany	-0.507 ***	-2.70	-0.920 ***	-4.96
religious	0.394	1.62	0.224	1.02
# siblings	0.186 ***	3.88	0.100 **	1.99
<25	-0.666 ***	-3.43	-0.898 ***	-4.12
25-29	0.171	0.89	-0.165	-0.74
Ref:30-34				
35-39	-0.900 ***	-3.71	-1.533 ***	-5.60
40+	-1.855 ***	-7.55	-3.394 ***	-9.26
married	0.588 ***	3.69	0.721 ***	4.04
primary education	-0.724 ***	-2.91	-0.282	-1.06
secondary education	-0.156	-1.05	-0.291 *	-1.83
ref: tertiary education				
part time	-0.776 ***	-2.67	-0.466 ***	-2.43
working schedule flexibility	-0.008	-0.06	0.211	1.50
workplace crèche	0.617 ***	2.41	0.417 *	1.65
public	0.127	0.82	0.034	0.22
ref: highly skilled profession				
clerk	0.342 *	1.73	0.182	0.91
worker	-0.403 **	-1.87	0.281	1.29
farmer & other statuses	0.067	0.33	0.161	0.57
intercept	0.259	1.01	1.022 ***	3.72
N	1241		1190	
Pseudo R2	12.7		16.2	

Appendix 2b: **Regression results for intention for another child by family-friendly policy (logit)**

	Working men with children		Working women with children	
	Coef.	T stat	Coef.	T stat
Ref: France				
Russia	-0.030	-0.21	-0.770 ***	-5.10
Germany	-0.619 ***	-3.65	-0.843 ***	-5.32
religious	0.651 ***	4.19	0.502 ***	3.37
# siblings	0.139 ***	5.10	0.053	1.60
<25	-1.496 ***	-6.05	-0.247	-1.15
25-29	-0.315 **	-2.18	0.307 **	2.34
Ref:30-34				
35-39	-0.813 ***	-6.37	-1.022 ***	-7.42
40+	-1.591 ***	-9.84	-1.873 ***	-9.84
married	-0.308 ***	-2.56	-0.138	-1.26
1 child	2.105 ***	10.62	-1.951 ***	-15.63
2 children	0.204	1.03	-2.307 ***	-9.67
ref: 3 children+				
age youngest child	-0.086 ***	-6.50	-0.078 ***	-5.44
primary education	-0.183	-1.11	-0.311	-1.57
secondary education	-0.507 ***	-4.01	-0.155	-1.31
ref: tertiary education				
part time	-0.214	-0.63	0.055	0.43
working schedule flexibility	0.127	1.21	0.086	0.82
workplace crèche	0.452 ***	2.86	0.133	0.81
public	-0.191 *	-1.70	-0.110	-0.92
ref: highly skilled profession				
clerk	-0.138	-0.86	-0.332 ***	-2.55
worker	-0.049	-0.28	-0.202	-1.46
farmer & other statuses	-0.248 *	-1.64	-0.355 **	-2.04
regular help with childcare	0.054	0.50	0.079	0.72
informal help	0.078	0.75	-0.319 ***	-3.05
intercept	-0.816 ***	-2.97	1.414 ***	6.10
N	3529		4332	
Pseudo R2	24.7		28.9	